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SOCIAL NORMS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW 
Matthew Tokson* & Ari Ezra Waldman** 
Courts often look to existing social norms to resolve difficult questions in 
Fourth Amendment law. In theory, these norms can provide an objective basis 
for courts’ constitutional decisions, grounding Fourth Amendment law in fa-
miliar societal attitudes and beliefs. In reality, however, social norms can shift 
rapidly, are constantly being contested, and frequently reflect outmoded and 
discriminatory concepts. This Article draws on contemporary sociological lit-
eratures on norms and technology to reveal how courts’ reliance on norms 
leads to several identifiable errors in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Courts assessing social norms generally adopt what we call the closure princi-
ple, or the idea that social norms can be permanently settled. Meanwhile, 
courts confronting new technologies often adopt the nonintervention principle, 
or the idea that courts should refrain from addressing the Fourth Amendment 
implications of new surveillance practices until the relevant social norms be-
come clear. Both approaches are flawed, and they have substantial negative 
effects for equality and privacy. By adopting norms perceived as closed, courts 
may embed antiquated norms in Fourth Amendment law—norms that often 
involve discrimination on the basis of race, gender, or class. By declining to 
intervene when norms are undeveloped, courts cede power over norm creation 
to companies that design new technologies based on data-extractive business 
models. Further, judicial norm reliance and nonintervention facilitate surveil-
lance creep, the extension of familiar data-gathering infrastructures to new 
types of surveillance. 
This Article provides, for the first time, a full, critical account of the role of 
social norms in Fourth Amendment law. It details and challenges courts’ reli-
ance on social norms in virtually every aspect of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. And it explores potential new directions for Fourth Amendment law, 
including novel doctrinal paradigms, different conceptions of stare decisis in 
the Fourth Amendment context, and alternative institutional regimes for reg-
ulating government surveillance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Social norms play a central role in Fourth Amendment law. The Supreme 
Court has emphasized the “great significance given to widely shared social ex-
pectations” and “social practice,” which can act as “a foundation of Fourth 
Amendment rights.” 1 Indeed, for Fourth Amendment purposes, our 
“[e]xpectations of privacy are established by general social norms.” 2 Courts’ 
 
 1. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113–14 (2006); see also, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) (stating that reasonable expectations of privacy “must have a 
source outside of the Fourth Amendment” grounded in either property ownership or “under-
standings that are recognized and permitted by society”). 
 2. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see also, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 
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assessments of norms drive outcomes in every aspect of Fourth Amendment 
law, including searches, 3 seizures, 4 reasonable suspicion, 5 consent searches, 6 
and special-needs inspections performed without probable cause. 7 
Social norms are the informal standards of conduct or widely accepted 
behaviors that characterize a given community. 8 As such, they can give courts 
an ostensibly objective basis for their Fourth Amendment decisions, ground-
ing their rulings in longstanding societal practices that people know and un-
derstand. Courts relying on social norms do not, in other words, start from 
scratch—they identify and adopt existing societal attitudes toward surveil-
lance or police behavior and use those attitudes to chart the course of consti-
tutional law. 9 The conventional account of social norms in Fourth 
Amendment law largely supports their use whenever feasible. 10 
This Article challenges the conventional account and gives a fuller and 
more nuanced picture of courts’ reliance on social norms in Fourth Amend-
ment law. It shows the dangers of the Fourth Amendment’s current course, 
which ultimately privileges the data-extractive interests of technology compa-
nies and government entities over individual rights. 
Currently, most courts assessing social norms approach them in one of 
two ways. When courts perceive that relevant social norms are stable, they 
adopt what we are calling the closure principle, or the idea that social norms 
can become more or less settled. In these situations, courts frequently apply 
social norms to resolve Fourth Amendment cases. When courts perceive that 
relevant social norms have not yet stabilized, they instead adopt what we call 
the nonintervention principle, or the idea that courts should decline to weigh 
in on new surveillance practices until the relevant social norms become clear. 
 
1, 9 (2013) (basing its holding on the “background social norms” that govern approaches to the 
front door of a home). 
 3. E.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990). 
 4. E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 205–06 (2002). 
 5. E.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000). 
 6. E.g., Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111. 
 7. E.g., Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 535–36 (1967). 
 8. Sanford Labovitz & Robert Hagedorn, Measuring Social Norms, 16 PAC. SOCIO. REV. 
283, 284 (1973) (stating that social norms are standards of conduct that “should or should not 
be followed”); see also C.A. Harwell Wells, Note, The End of the Affair? Anti-dueling Laws and 
Social Norms in Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805, 1809 (2001) (providing that norms 
are activities “society holds that people should do”); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 
7–8 (2000) (positing that social norms are imitative behavioral patterns grounded in cooperative 
relationships). Most legal scholars tie social norms to the prospect of informal social sanctions. 
See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 
338, 340 (1997) (stating that norms are “informal social regularities that individuals feel obli-
gated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal 
sanctions, or both”); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 537, 549 n.58 (1998) (“[A] norm is a rule supported by a pattern of informal sanctions.”). 
 9. See infra Section I.B. 
 10. See infra Section I.A. 
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In these situations, courts generally refrain from addressing the Fourth 
Amendment implications of new technologies whenever possible. 
These approaches are exemplified by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
City of Ontario v. Quon, which involved the warrantless inspection of the text 
messages of government employees. 11 There, the Court explicitly refused to 
consider “far-reaching” issues raised by new surveillance-enhancing technol-
ogies, arguing that the judiciary “risks error by elaborating too fully on the 
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in so-
ciety has become clear.” 12 
This Article’s analysis, drawing on the contemporary sociological litera-
ture on norms and technology, reveals the flaws inherent in courts’ current 
approaches. Social norms are neither immutable nor independent of sociole-
gal institutions. They are constantly being contested, and even seemingly sta-
ble norms are susceptible to gradual or rapid change. 13 Moreover, law has the 
capacity to alter social norms by expressing values that influence attitudes and 
behavior. The expressive force of early laws limiting where people could 
smoke cigarettes eventually altered social norms around smoking, providing 
the impetus for greater restrictions. 14 Antisodomy laws, though largely unen-
forced, shaped social norms by stigmatizing gay people—and their invalida-
tion by the Supreme Court in 2003 helped to promote norms favoring equality 
and acceptance. 15 In neither case were existing social norms “closed,” and law 
played a vital role in shaping and improving norms going forward. 
The law’s power to generate and influence norms is no different when 
new technologies are involved. Technologies are themselves socially con-
structed, as users adapt them to existing social structures in unpredictable 
ways and shape their future development. The car, the telephone, the internet, 
the smartphone, and countless apps and other software have been shaped in 
profound ways by law and social processes. 16 
Leveraging these insights, we identify substantial flaws in Fourth Amend-
ment paradigms that rely on existing social norms or wait for them to settle 
 
 11. 560 U.S. 746, 750 (2010). 
 12. Quon, 560 U.S. at 759. 
 13. See infra Section II.A. 
 14. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 625–28 (2000) (discussing how law’s incremental approach to regulating 
cigarettes effectively changed norms around smoking). 
 15. See infra Section II.A; see also Nan D. Hunter, Sexual Orientation and the Paradox of 
Heightened Scrutiny, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1528, 1536 (2004); Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Crim-
inals: The Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 
(2000); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of 
Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880–1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1069 (1997); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning 
About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1729 
(1993); cf. Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capital and Law’s Expressive Function, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1039, 1040–41 (1999) (suggesting sodomy laws are paradigms of law’s expres-
sive value). 
 16. See infra Section II.B. 
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before intervening. First, courts adopting existing social norms can entrench 
ideas that are outmoded and discriminatory. 17 Norms regarding police–citi-
zen interactions, which encourage voluntary interaction with police officers 
and compliance with police demands, 18 can have racially discriminatory im-
pacts. Norms involving domestic privacy and appropriate social behavior may 
have disparate gender impacts and can make it more difficult for authorities 
to prevent domestic abuse. 19 And norms surrounding residential buildings 
and workplace behavior can discriminate against poorer citizens or those with 
unstable employment situations. 20 In several important cases, courts have 
based their Fourth Amendment rulings on dominant social practices without 
asking why those practices exist. In doing so, they have often embedded dis-
criminatory norms into constitutional law. 
Second, courts that decline to intervene until norms have settled cede 
norm creation to data-extractive technology companies and encourage unfet-
tered government surveillance. Proponents of nonintervention justify judicial 
neutrality by suggesting that sociotechnical norms should settle organically, 
as users and designs adapt to each other, without the judiciary putting a thumb 
on the scale. 21 But a thumb is already on the scale. In practice, sociotechnical 
norms are not organically generated by autonomous individuals. They are fil-
tered through the economic interests of the most powerful actors in the field: 
the companies that design those technologies. Their business models are 
based on the idea that data is profit, an idea that scholars have called “surveil-
lance capitalism” or “informational capitalism.” 22 These companies carefully 
design and market products to encourage sharing, nudge consumer behavior 
toward disclosure, and desensitize users to the potential harms of surveillance. 
These processes influence the development of sociotechnical norms, pushing 
them toward greater acceptance of surveillance and devaluation of privacy. By 
declining to get involved in the business of norm generation, courts allow so-
ciotechnical norms to develop in ways that align with data-extractive interests. 
Further, if courts wait for sociotechnical norms to stabilize before regu-
lating the government’s use of new surveillance technologies, they will allow 
 
 17. See infra Section III.A. 
 18. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 
194, 203–06 (2002). 
 19. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111–14 (2006). 
 20. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984). Compare Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 
1663, 1670 (2018) (holding that police officers could not enter the curtilage of a home without a 
warrant), with United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
tenant had no reasonable expectation of privacy against police presence in his apartment hallway 
regardless of whether the police were trespassing). 
 21. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010). 
 22. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 8 (2019); JULIE E. 
COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL 
CAPITALISM 6 (2019). 
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many forms of surveillance to go unchecked. 23 Social norms rarely definitively 
settle, and it may take several years or decades for technologies and norms to 
stabilize even partially. 24 Until they do, the government will have free reign to 
surveil citizens—and the cycle will begin anew with each new form of tech-
nology. 
Finally, judicial nonintervention facilitates “surveillance creep,” the use of 
existing data-gathering technologies to accommodate new types of surveil-
lance and information collection. For instance, the establishment of traffic 
cameras on public streets makes it easier for the government to gather facial 
recognition data on passersby because the mechanism for this surveillance is 
already in place. 25 Surveillance creep can also have a powerful impact on social 
norms around technology because of its ability to normalize new surveillance 
as merely an extension of existing practices. Courts have been vulnerable to 
this effect, often treating new, invasive surveillance practices as benign be-
cause they use familiar surveillance infrastructures. 26 
Norms may still have a place in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, de-
spite these serious concerns. But rather than simply adopting norms they per-
ceive are settled, courts must question whether those norms are justifiable. And 
courts that choose not to intervene when confronted with new data-gathering 
technologies should appreciate the pro-surveillance effects of nonintervention. 
Based on our analysis, we explore new directions for Fourth Amendment 
law that can allow courts to intervene effectively in novel cases and avoid reli-
ance on existing norms. Alternative paradigms of Fourth Amendment law 
could encourage courts to look ahead at the effects of surveillance rather than 
looking back at outmoded norms. Courts could embed flexibility in Fourth 
Amendment law by expressly limiting the force of stare decisis for decisions 
addressing new technologies for which rapid contextual change is the rule ra-
ther than the exception. Finally, alternative institutional arrangements for reg-
ulating government surveillance could be adopted, with legislatures and 
administrative agencies working alongside courts to comprehensively address 
new surveillance technologies. Together, these novel approaches can help re-
alize the promise of the Fourth Amendment as a shield against government 
overreach in an era of rapidly evolving surveillance technologies. 
 
 23. Contra Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 526 (2011) (“The Supreme Court should generally decline to review how 
the Fourth Amendment applies to a new technology until the technology, its use, and its societal 
implications have stabilized.”). 
 24. See infra Section III.B.1. 
 25. See infra Section III.C. 
 26. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
undercover agents could record conversations inside a suspect’s home on the basis of prior cases 
permitting entry by agents lacking recording devices); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 
510–11 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling that agents could use a device to monitor an individual’s internet 
and email traffic based on a prior case permitting the use of a similar device to track dialed phone 
numbers). 
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Our concerns about judicial adoption of the closure and nonintervention 
principles are not strictly academic. Their continued use in Fourth Amend-
ment law poses particular risks today. State and local governments deployed 
industry-designed contact tracing apps to monitor COVID-19 outbreaks, 
with little infrastructure in place to guard against government use of the apps’ 
data for surveillance purposes. 27 Cities are repurposing streetlight traffic cam-
eras to surveil protesters and other law enforcement targets. 28 Moreover, at a 
time when many institutions are finally reckoning with the nation’s legacies 
of racism and sexism, Fourth Amendment law’s continued embrace of anti-
quated norms is ripe for reform. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I surveys the conventional theo-
retical account of social norms in Fourth Amendment law. It then describes 
several cases across many areas that expressly rely on such norms to determine 
the scope and content of the Fourth Amendment. Part II examines the socio-
logical literature on norms and the law’s role in shaping them. It defines and 
critiques the closure principle and describes the social construction of tech-
nology. Part III challenges the widespread use of social norms in Fourth 
Amendment law. It evaluates the discriminatory effects of existing norms used 
in several prominent cases and analyzes the legal and social harms of judicial 
nonintervention in contexts involving new technologies. Part IV explores po-
tential new directions for Fourth Amendment law that rely less heavily on so-
cial norms. It sets out several alternative approaches, including new doctrinal 
approaches, more flexible conceptions of stare decisis in cases involving new 
technologies, and unconventional institutional regimes for regulating govern-
ment surveillance. 
I. SOCIAL NORMS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The following Sections review the conventional account of the role of so-
cial norms in Fourth Amendment law. They examine some of the most prom-
inent cases that rely on norms to determine the scope or application of the 
Fourth Amendment. They also describe the common judicial practice of de-
clining to intervene when norms surrounding a new technology are still in 
flux. As this Part demonstrates, when courts perceive that norms are stable, 
they generally adopt the closure principle; when courts perceive that norms 
are unsettled, they generally adopt the nonintervention principle. 
A. The Conventional Account of Social Norms 
The conventional wisdom in Fourth Amendment law largely endorses the 
use of social norms whenever possible. When identifiable social norms exist, 
 
 27. See infra note 251 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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courts can draw on them as an objective, external basis for Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine. 29 Social norms, behaviors, and values help determine what we 
consider private and which government actions we consider reasonable.30 
These norms sometimes may be difficult to discern, but correctly identified 
norms offer useful guidance in an otherwise difficult area of law.31 
Legally relevant social norms are generally thought to arise from social 
practices that become accepted, repeated, and routinized over time. 32 When 
people consider a prevalent social practice to be justified and beneficial, it 
gains a normative edge, and may be associated with social pressures to comply 
and informal sanctions for noncompliance. 33 These social norms may even-
tually be embedded as law. 34 In the commercial law context, this often takes 
the form of incorporating longstanding customs into the common law of trade 
and contract. 35 A similar process can be observed in Fourth Amendment law, 
as norms of privacy and law enforcement practice are gradually codified as 
constitutional law. 36 
 
 29. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113–14 (2006) (stating that “widely 
shared social expectations” and “social practice” can act as “foundation[s] of Fourth Amend-
ment rights”); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (noting that one ground for rea-
sonable expectations of privacy is “understandings that are recognized and permitted by 
society”); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 107 (2008); William C. Hef-
fernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 37 (2001). 
 30. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fit-
ting the Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 
1415 (2004); Heffernan, supra note 29, at 43; see also Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1090–91 (2002) (positing that privacy interests are largely dependent on 
social practices and values). 
 31. Heffernan, supra note 29, at 37. 
 32. Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Decentralizing Fourth Amendment Search Doctrine, 
107 KY. L.J. 169, 195 (2018). By social norms, we refer to practices and informal rules that have 
arisen due to repeated use and taken on the mantle of social approval. We do not refer to societal 
attitudes or expectations, as might be measured by public surveys regarding various aspects of 
Fourth Amendment law. See, e.g., Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Assessing the 
Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 498 (2019); Chris-
tine S. Scott-Hayward, Henry F. Fradella & Ryan G. Fischer, Does Privacy Require Secrecy? Soci-
etal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 19, 46 (2015). These are unlikely 
to present the problems of closure, discrimination, and delay that we identify in the context of 
social-norm use. 
 33. Mannheimer, supra note 32, at 196; Heffernan, supra note 29, at 43–44. 
 34. Mannheimer, supra note 32, at 197–99; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 
786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part 
reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present.”). 
 35. Mannheimer, supra note 32, at 197–99. 
 36. Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 107; Heffernan, supra note 29, at 37. 
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Social norms may be difficult to identify, and the Supreme Court has 
given little guidance on how to assess norms for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses. 37 Moreover, the Court’s assessments of norms can be criticized as inac-
curate or biased in favor of the government. 38 But at least when the Justices 
perceive that norms are settled, the Court has frequently used them to deter-
mine the contours of Fourth Amendment law. 39 
By contrast, in cases involving new technologies where social norms and 
practices have not yet reached maturity, judges and scholars have argued for 
caution. 40 In these situations, the conventional account suggests it may be 
more prudent for courts to avoid deciding Fourth Amendment questions 
whenever possible. 41 As the Supreme Court has warned, “The judiciary risks 
error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of 
emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.” 42 Caution 
may be especially justified, according to this account, when a technology and 
the social practices surrounding it continue to change rapidly. 43 In contexts 
where “it is uncertain how . . . norms, and the law’s treatment of them, will 
evolve,” courts may avoid ruling broadly on Fourth Amendment issues and 
allow social norms and practices to settle before intervening. 44 Only Justice 
Scalia disagreed with this account of the role of norms in technology cases, 
and even he expressly endorsed the use of social norms in setting the bound-
aries of Fourth Amendment protection in other contexts. 45 
B. The Jurisprudence of Social Norms 
Courts decide Fourth Amendment cases using a variety of doctrines, 
precedents, and policy considerations. Social norms alone do not dictate every 
Fourth Amendment outcome. However, when social norms or practices are 
 
 37. Heffernan, supra note 29, at 37. 
 38. Blitz, supra note 30, at 1415. 
 39. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (describing how the Court in 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), used its knowledge and experience of telephone prac-
tices to identify a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone calls); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 
128, 143 n.12 (1978) (“Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside 
of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 
103, 111–13 (2006) (noting the central importance of social understandings and practices to 
Fourth Amendment consent doctrines); Kerr, supra note 23, at 539. 
 40. Quon, 560 U.S. at 759; Kerr, supra note 23, at 540. 
 41. See supra note 40. 
 42. Quon, 560 U.S. at 759. 
 43. Id. at 748 (“Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information trans-
mission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behav-
ior.”). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 768 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Flor-
ida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013) (Scalia, J.) (“Here, the background social norms that invite a 
visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search.”). 
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relevant to the issue at hand, courts frequently rely on them to determine the 
course of Fourth Amendment law. This happens most often when courts per-
ceive those norms to be settled, stable, or “closed.” 
The Supreme Court has itself characterized social norms as an objective 
basis for the Fourth Amendment’s scope. For example, a Fourth Amendment 
search occurs when government officials violate a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. 46 The Court has stated that reasonable expectations of privacy “must 
have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,” one grounded either in 
property ownership or in social norms, defined as “understandings that are 
recognized and permitted by society.” 47 In another case, a plurality of justices 
stated directly that “[e]xpectations of privacy are established by general social 
norms.” 48 Lower courts and leading Fourth Amendment treatises have echoed 
this statement, expressly tying the Fourth Amendment to assessments of so-
cial norms. 49 Looking to existing norms can allow courts to flesh out the rea-
sonable expectation of privacy test by reference to objective social facts and 
customs. 50 
For example, in Fourth Amendment scope cases, the Supreme Court has 
drawn a line between houseguests with privacy rights and houseguests with-
out such rights based on its assessments of social norms. In Minnesota v. Ol-
son, the Court concluded that an overnight houseguest could challenge a 
police search of his friend’s house. 51 The opinion engaged in a lengthy analysis 
of established social customs and practices, ultimately concluding that home-
owners hosting their friends for an overnight visit typically grant their guests 
a measure of control and privacy within their home. 52 The norms are differ-
 
 46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme 
Court has recently adopted a separate test that also finds a Fourth Amendment search when a 
government official physically intrudes on property for the purpose of gathering information. 
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7–10; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012). In practice, 
this has added little to the Katz test, and the Supreme Court cases in which it has been employed 
may have reached the same outcome under Katz. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 12–16 (Kagan, J., con-
curring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 418–31 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 47. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). 
 48. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981) (plurality opinion), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
 49. See, e.g., Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 760 (Md. 2014) (“[C]ommon experience and 
social norms bear upon our assessment of whether one has an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy in a particular item or place. . . . ‘Expectations of privacy are established by general 
social norms.’ ” (cleaned up) (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 51 n.3 (1988))); 1 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(d), at 605 (6th ed. 2020) (“[I]t is necessary to 
look to ‘the customs and values of the past and present.’ ” (quoting United States v. White, 401 
U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
 50. Blitz, supra note 30, at 1415; Rubenfeld, supra note 29, at 107. 
 51. 495 U.S. 91, 93 (1990). 
 52. Olson, 495 U.S. at 98–99 (noting that “[s]taying overnight in another’s home is a 
longstanding social custom that serves functions recognized as valuable by society” and giving a 
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ent, however, for shorter-duration guests, and the Fourth Amendment ac-
cordingly offers them less protection. 53 The Court’s detailed analyses of the 
social roles of host and houseguest provided the foundation for the these 
Fourth Amendment rulings. This pattern recurs in numerous Fourth Amend-
ment scope cases. 54 
Likewise, in Fourth Amendment consent cases, the Court gives “great sig-
nificance . . . to widely shared social expectations” and “social practice[s],” 
which can act as “foundation[s] of Fourth Amendment rights.” 55 Thus a po-
lice officer can enter a house with the permission of only one cotenant because 
“customary social usage” permits such entry. 56 But if another tenant is present 
and objects, “commonly held understanding[s] about the authority that co-
inhabitants may exercise” dictate that the officer cannot enter. 57 The Court 
determined that entering a house over the objection of a present tenant would 
violate social norms of propriety. 58 
A similar reliance on social norms occurs in cases involving nonphysical 
seizures. 59 The norms that govern public buses, workplaces, and interactions 
with police officers often determine whether a person has been seized under 
the Fourth Amendment. 60 
 
lengthy and detailed analysis of the social norms and practices surrounding overnight house-
guests). 
 53. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998). The Carter Court concluded that 
there was no identifiable social custom or norm that would extend the full protections of the 
home to a person who was merely present for a short time. Id. 
 54. In Byrd v. United States, the Court held that a driver who borrowed a rented car with 
the permission of the renter had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car because social 
norms dictate that a friend might use a car for a variety of legitimate reasons. 138 S. Ct. 1518, 
1527–29 (2018). Social norms also play a central role in the leading case applying trespass con-
cepts to determine the Fourth Amendment’s scope. For instance, Florida v. Jardines relied on 
the “background social norms that invite a visitor to the front door” to hold that police officers 
violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when they approached his front door with a 
drug-sniffing dog. 569 U.S. 1, 8–9, 11–12 (2013); see also, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 
334, 338–39 (2000) (determining that an officer’s squeezing and manipulating the carry-on bag 
of a bus passenger went beyond socially acceptable practices and was therefore a Fourth Amend-
ment search); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100, 105 (1980) (holding that a defendant had 
no Fourth Amendment right in another’s handbag when he had not known her well prior to the 
search); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (basing its holding on “the vital role that 
the public telephone has come to play in private communication”). 
 55. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111, 113–14 (2006). 
 56. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 303 (2014) (quoting Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121). 
 57. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111–13. 
 58. Id. at 113–14. 
 59. The typical Fourth Amendment seizure involves the arrest or physical detention of a 
suspect. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). 
 60. E.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197–98, 203–05 (2002) (relying on the 
prevailing norm of cooperation with police officers to conclude that a bus passenger could have 
declined officers’ requests to search his bag and pat down his clothes); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 
210, 212, 218 (1984) (relying on workplace norms to conclude that immigration agents did not 
seize factory workers when several agents blocked the factory exits while other agents questioned 
workers). 
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Finally, courts assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures often 
rely on social norms. 61 The Supreme Court has implicitly endorsed this prac-
tice, noting that the reasonableness of a stop and frisk “must be based on com-
monsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” 62 Social norms 
and practices play a pivotal role in other reasonableness cases as well, espe-
cially cases involving administrative searches or suspicionless drug testing in 
state-controlled settings. 63 
The Supreme Court, and courts in general, do not overtly assess social 
norms in every Fourth Amendment case. But when norms are relevant and 
clear, courts often use them in shaping Fourth Amendment law. This process 
is complicated, however, when courts attempt to address new technologies 
that are not yet associated with established social norms or practices. 
C. Contested Social Norms and Judicial Nonintervention 
New technologies pose some of the most difficult issues in Fourth 
Amendment law. 64 Modern devices and services also present a variety of com-
plex issues involving social norms and practices. 65 For instance, whether in-
formation disclosed to dating apps, smart-home devices, social media sites, or 
internet service providers is protected by the Fourth Amendment may depend 
on the social customs surrounding those technologies. 66 In the face of these 
complexities, courts have often hesitated to apply the Fourth Amendment to 
new technological contexts. 67 
When courts perceive that social norms surrounding a technology have 
begun to harden, however, they have eagerly turned to them as objective bases 
for their decisions, adopting what we call the closure principle, or the idea that 
 
 61. This practice arguably comports with the text and history of the Amendment itself. 
See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 303 (2012) (“The word ‘unrea-
sonable’ in the Fourth Amendment also authorizes interpreters to take evolving social norms 
into account.”). 
 62. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). 
 63. For instance, social norms appear to shape the outcomes of the Supreme Court’s 
drug-testing cases. Compare Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 & n.14 (2001) (hold-
ing that it was not reasonable for a state hospital to disclose pregnant women’s drug–test results 
to the police, partly because doing so violated the traditional understanding that the results of 
diagnostic tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel), with Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648, 665 (1995) (holding that it was reasonable to require high school ath-
letes to take random drug tests, in part because athletes were role models in the school). 
 64. Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. 1039 (2016); Kerr, supra note 23, at 486; DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN 
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017). 
 65. See Matthew Tokson, The Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 741 (2019). 
 66. See Matthew Tokson, Inescapable Surveillance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 409 (2021) (not-
ing that the ubiquity and social importance of these services and devices may determine whether 
they are protected by the Fourth Amendment under current law). 
 67. E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); United States v. Graham, 
824 F.3d 421, 429 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
November 2021] Social Norms in Fourth Amendment Law 277 
social norms can be definitively settled. For example, in Katz v. United States, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment prohibited the warrant-
less recording of telephone calls, with the majority emphasizing “the vital role 
that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.” 68 By 
the time Katz was decided in 1967, it was clear that a person who entered a 
telephone booth, shut its door, and paid to use the phone was entitled to pri-
vacy—if not from visual observation, then from “the uninvited ear.” 69 The 
Court’s assessment came several decades after the telephone was popularized, 
when the social role of the telephone was relatively stable and mature. 70 
In recent years, the Court has made similar assessments about the ubiq-
uity and social role of cell phones. Riley v. California, which ruled that cell 
phones could not be searched incident to arrest, was based on the Court’s 
findings that most people depend on their cell phones and carry them wher-
ever they go, sometimes even into the shower. 71 Moreover, given the way peo-
ple use cell phones—to send personal communications, store photographs, 
browse the internet, and set their personal schedules—they tend to contain 
“the privacies of life.” 72 The Court relied on a similar analysis in Carpenter v. 
United States to hold that the Fourth Amendment required police to obtain a 
warrant before tracking cell phone signals. 73 
However, in cases involving new technologies around which social prac-
tices were still indeterminate, the Court has taken a more cautious approach, 
adopting what we call the nonintervention principle. This refers to the idea that 
courts should decline to address the Fourth Amendment implications of new 
surveillance practices until the relevant social norms become clear. In Kyllo v. 
United States, the Court found that the use of infrared-camera technology to 
scan a home required a warrant. 74 The Court added the caveat that its decision 
applied when the technology at issue was not “in general public use.” 75 Were 
the technology in general use, the social norms and practices surrounding it 
would be different, and accordingly people might not reasonably expect pri-
vacy in their homes. 76 
 
 68. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). 
 69. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 70. Kerr, supra note 23, at 539. Katz overturned a prior Supreme Court decision, Olmstead, 
277 U.S. 438, decided when telephone technology was not as settled or widespread. See CLAUDE S. 
FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO 1940, at 49–50 (1992). 
 71. 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014). 
 72. Riley, 573 U.S. at 394–96; id. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 
(1886)). 
 73. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). The Court discussed in detail how people typically use 
their cell phones, which have become “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy.’ ” Carpenter, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2218 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 385). Cell phone users “compulsively” carry these devices 
around with them and bring them everywhere they travel, even to sensitive appointments and 
private meetings. Id. 
 74. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 75. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 76. See Kerr, supra note 23, at 541. 
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In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court declined to rule at all on whether 
text messages sent from workplace phones are protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. 77 It expressly warned of the difficulties of addressing a new tech-
nology “before its role in society has become clear.” 78 When a technology is 
mature and its social role is more defined, the justices can rely on their own 
knowledge and experience to determine the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment. 79 But here, “[r]apid changes in the dynamics of communication and 
information transmission [were] evident not just in the technology itself but 
in what society accepts as proper behavior.” 80 Because it was uncertain how 
the relevant social norms would evolve, the Court declined to weigh in. 81 
The Supreme Court’s caution in addressing new technologies not associ-
ated with clear social norms is also reflected in its reluctance to take cases in-
volving such technologies. Despite the ongoing proliferation of information 
and surveillance technologies in the digital era, the Court has decided rela-
tively few Fourth Amendment cases outside of traditional law enforcement 
contexts. 82 In recent years, the Court has declined to review cases involving a 
wide variety of novel technologies, including surveillance cameras, 83 web-
surfing tracking, 84 email to/from data, 85 real-time cell phone tracking, 86 tower 
 
 77. 560 U.S. 746, 758–59 (2010). Resolving the case on narrower grounds, the Court held 
that even if the Fourth Amendment protected work text messages, the search of Quon’s messages 
was justified by the special needs of his workplace and the noncriminal purpose of the initial 
review of his messages. Quon, 560 U.S. at 760–61. 
 78. Id. at 759. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. (“At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the law’s treatment of 
them, will evolve.”). 
 82. See Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 59 tbl.1 (2020), for a survey of the Court’s Fourth Amendment search cases, 
which have largely focused on traditional surveillance practices. 
 83. United States v. Houston, 137 S. Ct. 567 (2016), denying cert. to 813 F.3d 282, 286–88 
(6th Cir. 2016) (pole camera pointed at defendant’s residence); United States v. Wymer, 137 S. 
Ct. 832 (2017), denying cert. to 654 F. App’x 735, 743 (6th Cir. 2016) (pole camera pointed at 
defendants’ business). 
 84. Alba v. United States, 555 U.S. 908 (2008), denying cert. to United States v. Forrester, 
512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (list of websites a suspect had visited); Ulbricht v. United States, 
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018), denying cert. to 858 F.3d 71, 97 (2d Cir. 2017) (same). 
 85. Alba, 555 U.S. 908 (list of emails sent to and from a suspect). 
 86. Riley v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2705 (2018), denying cert. to 858 F.3d 1012, 1018 (6th 
Cir. 2017); Powell v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 143 (2017), denying cert. to 847 F.3d 760, 770 (6th 
Cir. 2017). 
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simulators, 87 cell tower dumps involving the disclosure of every user proxi-
mate to a cell tower, 88 images uploaded to a photo-storage site, 89 and internet 
subscriber information. 90 Even when the Court does resolve cases involving 
new technologies, it often resolves these cases on narrow grounds, explicitly 
limiting the impact of its reasoning for future cases. 91 This has significant 
downstream effects. Lower courts regularly cite the Supreme Court’s narrow-
ing language as a basis for denying privacy rights in cases involving novel tech-
nologies not yet analyzed by the Court. 92 
II. LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL NORMS 
As we have seen, courts often decide Fourth Amendment cases by looking 
to social norms. Courts assessing those norms typically perceive them as set-
tled and unchanging. Taking social norms as received wisdom or as social 
facts of life is to adopt the closure principle, 93 a principle that we now examine 
and critique. This Part leverages the legal and sociological literatures on norms 
to argue that norms rarely permanently stabilize but rather undergo frequent 
contestation and change. Further, norms are not prior to law. Instead, law has 
a critical role to play in nudging and creating new norms that challenge exist-
ing surveillance and enforcement practices. 
Social norms are neither immutable nor independent of the societal insti-
tutions they frame. 94 They are constantly being contested and reevaluated. 95 
 
 87. Sanchez-Jara v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 282 (2018), denying cert. to 889 F.3d 418, 419 
(7th Cir. 2018) (simulated cell towers capable of capturing nearby cell phone signals); Patrick v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018), denying cert. to 842 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2016) (same). 
 88. E.g., Adkinson v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2762 (2019), denying cert. to 916 F.3d 605, 
608, 610 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 89. Morel v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 283 (2019), denying cert. to 922 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 
2019) (search of defendant’s images on photo-storage site Imgur). 
 90. E.g., Wellbeloved-Stone v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 876 (2020), denying cert. to 777 F. 
App’x 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 91. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“Our decision today is a 
narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time [cell-site location 
information] or . . . a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular 
cell site during a particular interval . . . . Nor do we address other business records that might 
incidentally reveal location information.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 
(2012) (holding that police placement of a GPS device on a car violated the Fourth Amendment 
on the narrow ground that the physical touching of the car was a quasi-trespass); Mary-Rose 
Papandrea, Moving Beyond Cameras in the Courtroom: Technology, the Media, and the Supreme 
Court, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1901, 1934–38 (noting the narrowness of the Court’s technology-re-
lated decisions). 
 92. E.g., United States v. Kidd, 394 F. Supp. 3d 357, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); United States v. 
Kelly, 385 F. Supp. 3d 721, 726 (E.D. Wis. 2019). 
 93. See supra text following note 67. 
 94. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 52 (Steven Lukes ed., 
W.D. Halls trans., Free Press 1982) (1895) (defining “social facts” as the external coercive norms 
that both reflect and are changed by society). 
 95. See id. at 50–59. 
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And even when they do seem to stabilize, norms are susceptible to nudges and, 
less frequently, shocks. 96 Law has the capacity to alter social norms through 
its expressive force and ability to reshape behavior and social values. 97 For ex-
ample, laws about marriage influence ideas about gender, sex, and monog-
amy. 98 Laws protecting digital civil rights arguably affect people’s perceptions 
of, and willingness to engage in, online harassment. 99 And laws about police 
searches influence our perceptions of privacy and uses of technology. 100 In this 
Part, we push back against judicial adoption of the closure principle by first 
describing the generative relationship between law and social norms and then 
showing how law plays a role in directly and indirectly defining technology’s 
place in society. 
A. Law’s Influence on Social Norms 
Legal scholars used to assume that laws and norms were separate systems 
of social control. 101 For example, Robert Ellickson’s groundbreaking study 
showing how residents of Shasta County, California, resolved their disputes 
amongst themselves using extralegal norms painted a picture of social norms 
as largely independent of law. 102 Others suggested that law and norms played 
related, yet distinct roles in governing social and commercial transactions: 
“warm” social norms govern ongoing commercial relationships while “cold” 
law comes in as a last resort. 103 
Scholars now understand that law plays a far more influential role. The 
modern consensus is that norms and law are not parallel systems of social 
control; rather, they influence each other. As Cass Sunstein argued, law is an 
instrument of norm production and guidance that influences people’s behav-
ior by indirectly signaling what society thinks is good or bad, moral or evil, 
 
 96. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 67–68 (2008). 
 97. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031 (1996). 
 98. Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1901 (2000). 
 99. See Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 90–91 (2009) (argu-
ing that a civil rights agenda for online harassment would “inhibit abusive behavior” through 
norm generation); Danielle Keats Citron, Essay, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber 
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009) (exploring the argument in more detail). 
 100. See infra Part III. 
 101. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1646–47 (1996) (ar-
guing that law should generally reflect social norms); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Mer-
chant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 
1766–71 (1996) (distinguishing between relationship-preserving norms and “endgame” law). 
 102. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991). 
 103. See Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2055, 2056 (1996) (citing INGA MARKOVITS, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: AN EAST–WEST GERMAN 
DIARY 44, 55 (1995)). 
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appropriate or not. 104 Law has an “expressive function,”105 not just a coercive 
one, that creates “cultural consequences.” 106 Laws against flag burning, for ex-
ample, are primarily expressive in character: uf they ever were to pass, these 
laws would have insignificant coercive effects because flag burning is exceed-
ingly rare. Instead, supporters see flag-burning laws as “statement[s] about the 
venality of the act of flag burning, perhaps in order to affect social norms.” 107 
Laws with more tangible effects, including environmental restrictions like the 
Endangered Species Act and local composting rules, are also expressive: they 
are “symbol[s] of a certain conception of the relationship between human be-
ings and their environment” and hope to engender eco-friendly habits. 108 
Beyond their expressive function, law can affect norms in a variety of 
ways. Dan Kahan has argued that “gentle nudge[s]” can incrementally change 
existing social norms by encouraging individuals to “revise upward their judg-
ment of the degree of condemnation warranted by the conduct in ques-
tion.” 109 
Law’s role in changing attitudes about smoking is a notable example of 
the efficacy of gentle nudges. Faced with a population for which smoking was 
not only ordinary but also celebrated on television, Congress moved slowly, 
first requiring warning labels and then banning television advertisements. 110 
These initial steps reflected a “segmentation strategy” that still respected indi-
vidual autonomy while burdening the choice to smoke with symbolic con-
demnation. 111 Over time, steadily increasing restrictions on cigarettes—where 
people could smoke, how much they had to pay, and who could buy them—
tapped into nonsmokers’ growing “resentment” about the dangers of 
secondhand smoke. This allowed the law to catalyze additional social sanc-
tions, thereby helping norms around smoking to resettle at a point far re-
moved from a once pro-smoking culture. 112 Had we assumed that norms 
around smoking had hardened in the 1950s, today’s television shows might 
still be sponsored by Philip Morris. 
 
 104. Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2022–24. 
 105. Id. at 2024; see also Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2000) (arguing for an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
focusing on the expressive effects of discrimination rather than the intent of the state actor). 
 106. Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 936, 938 (1991). 
 107. Sunstein, supra note 97, at 2023. 
 108. Id. at 2024. 
 109. Kahan, supra note 14, at 610–11. A law that tries to create or entrench new norms 
through severe, disproportionate punishments—what Kahan calls a “hard shove”—however, 
could backfire. Id. at 608. 
 110. Id. at 625–26. 
 111. Id. at 627. 
 112. Id. at 627–28. Incremental nudges are more likely to change existing social norms if 
the incremental rules are consistently and conspicuously enforced. Id. at 610–11. 
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Law also clarifies appropriate behavior when norms are vague, a particu-
lar problem when new surveillance technologies appear on the market. 113 Eliz-
abeth Scott gives the example of elementary and secondary school truancy 
laws. 114 Scott notes that parents had always been subject to a vague norm 
about educating their children, but until the early twentieth century it had 
never been clear that good parenting necessarily meant keeping children in 
school throughout their childhood. 115 Attendance laws changed that. They 
gave parents a specific mandate around which to structure their responsibili-
ties for educating their children. Indeed, compulsory attendance laws were 
justified and sold to parents as ways to help them educate their children, create 
good citizens, and become good parents themselves. 116 This education norm, 
clarified by a specific legal requirement, was eventually internalized as a hall-
mark of good parenting.117 
Alex Geisinger argues that law can change our beliefs about both the mo-
rality and practical utility of activities by “providing information or by influ-
encing the inferential reasoning process.” 118 Seatbelt laws were effective at 
changing social norms because they came alongside publicized information 
about the dangers of riding without “buckling up.”119 
On a more structural level, law is one of several social institutions that set 
discourses of power that influence our understanding, assumptions, and de-
bates about social life. Discourses, as Michel Foucault explains, are the back-
ground knowledge, ideologies, assumptions, and modes of thought behind 
our thoughts, behaviors, and actions. 120 For example, in describing social un-
derstandings of homosexuality, Foucault argues that our conception of homo-
sexuality is influenced by the ideas, arguments, and language of institutions 
like religion (which only recently started to see same-sex relationships and 
sodomy as anathema to religious dogma) and science (which evolved from 
defining homosexuality as a disease to, by the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury, the opposite). 121 Law played a central role in defining queer people as 
“others,” as well. “As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy 
was a category of forbidden acts . . . .”122 Modern criminal approaches to sod-
omy, vagrancy laws, and unevenly enforced laws against public solicitation 
 
 113. See infra Section III.B. 
 114. Scott, supra note 98, at 1927. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 1926–27. 
 118. See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 63 
(2002). 
 119. See id. at 64. 
 120. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: AND THE DISCOURSE ON 
LANGUAGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969). 
 121. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., Pantheon 
Books 1978) (1976). 
 122. Id. at 43. 
November 2021] Social Norms in Fourth Amendment Law 283 
perpetuated bourgeois discourses that marginalized gay people as “abnormal” 
and kept them out of power. 123 The feminist scholars Reva Siegel, Judith But-
ler, Kathleen Jones, and Catharine MacKinnon have made similar arguments 
about the way law—alongside medicine, religion, and politics—have con-
structed gender norms to marginalize women. 124 Therefore, the law legiti-
mizes discourses of power not only when it generates new norms but when it 
fails to challenge those established by other institutions. Adopting the closure 
principle, then, can entrench the discourses of power embedded in society by 
other social groups. 125 
Although the functional mechanisms of law’s expressive value seem to 
suggest that new laws generate new norms, repealing a law and deregulating 
some aspect of social life can just as effectively indicate old norms’ obsoles-
cence and generate new social norms in their place. Since the Supreme Court 
held criminal sodomy laws unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas, 126 for ex-
ample, attitudes toward and support for queer equality have changed, with 
social norms generally favoring equality and more acceptance. 127 Prior to 
Lawrence, the persistence of antisodomy laws reinforced discriminatory social 
norms even in the absence of enforcement. 128 “[E]ven when unenforced,” sod-
omy laws “express[ed] contempt for certain classes of citizens” 129 by establish-
ing gay people as presumptive criminals—or “scum,” to use philosopher 
Richard Mohr’s term 130—on the basis of their sexual identity alone. Janet Hal-
ley similarly argued that maintaining sodomy laws, and the associated debates 
about them, contributed to stigma and forced people into the closet, stating 
that “[t]he role of the law in constituting persons by providing a forum for 
their conflicts over who they shall be understood to be is deeply material 
[and] . . . involves . . . the more subtle dynamics of representation.” 131 Chris-
topher Leslie went even further, demonstrating how sodomy laws did violence 
 
 123. Id. at 42–45; see also PAUL H. GEBHARD, JOHN H. GAGNON, WARDELL B. POMEROY & 
CORNELIA V. CHRISTENSON, SEX OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF TYPES 324 (1965) (“[T]he law 
against adult homosexual activity is designed not for the protection of person or property but 
for the enforcement of our cultural taboo against homosexuality.”). 
 124. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regu-
lation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Kathleen B. Jones, On Au-
thority: Or, Why Women Are Not Entitled to Speak, in AUTHORITY REVISITED: NOMOS XXIX 
152 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1987). 
 125. See infra Section III.A. 
 126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 127. See, e.g., Attitudes on Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage [perma.cc/X7M7-
P3TA]. Correlation does not necessarily imply causation, of course. 
 128. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 15, at 1535–36; Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1069; see also 
Mazzone, supra note 15, at 1041 (giving sodomy laws as an exemplar of law’s expressive value). 
 129. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 421 (1999). 
 130. RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW 60 (1988). 
 131. Halley, supra note 15, at 1729 (emphasis omitted). 
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to queer psychological wellbeing, encouraged antiqueer violence, and enabled 
police harassment. 132 These attacks were rationalized by sodomy law’s expres-
sive function: if the law said gay people were presumptive criminals, then they 
did not deserve constitutional rights. 133 Throughout, law played a central role 
in shaping social norms around homosexuality, first reinforcing hostile norms 
and then helping to generate more positive ones. 
B. Law and the Construction of Technology 
Law also creates and modifies norms around uses of new technologies. 
Smartphones, GPS, email, cloud storage, and almost any other digital technol-
ogy at issue in Fourth Amendment cases are creations of social institutions ra-
ther than just creatures of code. 134 The ways we use them and the expectations 
of privacy that attend those uses are no more “received wisdom” than are other 
evolving social norms. Therefore, accepting norms around technology as stable 
before the law has its say is to deny law a place in what Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) calls the “social construction of technology,” a process in which 
different social institutions fight to define technology’s place in society. 135 
STS scholars argue that technologies are not just discovered or built out 
of raw materials or lines of code. Rather, technologies are constructed: they are 
the products of human relations, understood by people, and used in daily life 
in ways sometimes unintended by their designers. Technologies are social ar-
tifacts because they are used, changed, and repurposed by people and institu-
tions long after they are put on the market. 136 New technologies undergo a 
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lation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND 
BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 196 (John Law ed., 1986); Michel Callon, The So-
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period of “interpretive flexibility” during which developers and users have dif-
ferent understandings of how things work and the purpose they serve, vying 
to establish different social norms in the process. 137 
For example, when rural farmers, who initially resisted the automobile as 
a threat to their way of life, started using the Model T as a stationary power 
source on their farms, they became “agents of technological change.” 138 Farm-
ers used cars to power light machinery and to transport goods rather than 
people. 139 Designers and manufacturers who resisted using the car as a simple 
power source tried to counteract this: they elevated the car’s rear wheels to 
make it difficult to double as a stable power source and built and marketed 
separate gasoline engines that could provide power when needed. 140 As a re-
sult, farmers created norms that influenced the next iteration of the car and 
spurred the creation of new products. 
The telephone, surprisingly enough, was not intended to be a tool of social 
communication when it was first built. The enterprises that built the first 
phones designed them purely for businesses or government agencies to trans-
mit information over long distances. 141 As Michèle Martin describes, rural 
women had a different idea. They used telephones to create the social contact 
they lacked under a patriarchal system that kept women in the home. Their 
norms forced changes in design of both the phones themselves and the wires 
that made communication possible. 142 
Similarly, Wiebe Bijker has shown that when the high-wheeled bicycle 
was introduced, older men tried to discourage everyone from using it, desig-
nating it as unsafe. The norm they helped set paved the way for the develop-
ment of a new, safer, smaller-wheeled bicycle several years later. 143 In all of 
these contexts, consumers identified new uses for products that designers 
never intended, ultimately leading to changes in design. 144 
Law is one of the social institutions involved in the social construction of 
technology. Law undoubtedly affects technology design. Intellectual property, 
tort, and products liability law, among other areas, directly affect how tech-
nologies are made. For instance, patent and copyright doctrines encourage in-
novators to “invent around” or “create around” others’ designs, and they hold 
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creators liable for infringement when they get too close to an existing prod-
uct. 145 Trade secrecy law influences how competing products are designed: re-
verse engineering is permissible, but not if it is based on unlawfully obtained 
information. 146 Tort law has generated a series of behavioral standards that 
define how companies design, manufacture, and market products. 147 
We already have examples of law trying to influence the designs and 
norms of information technologies, with varying degrees of success. When the 
information industry introduced end-to-end encryption and eliminated so-
called “back doors” that governments could use to access information on 
smartphones and other platforms, the U.S. Department of Justice pushed 
back, citing national security concerns. 148 Law enforcement attempted to use 
the All Writs Act to force Apple to design a back door into the iPhone owned 
by the domestic terrorist who killed fourteen people at a San Bernardino com-
munity center in 2015. 149 In addition, as nations tried to use technology-en-
hanced contact tracing to manage outbreaks during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
privacy law in Europe and privacy regulators in the United States facilitated 
the creation of decentralized tracing apps that preserved some level of privacy 
while allowing health experts to track COVID hotspots. 150 
Privacy law does this as well by influencing norms around sharing and 
design. Danielle Citron has argued that creating special legal protections for 
sexual privacy can encourage people to value their privacy when downloading 
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menstruation apps or disclosing HIV status on a dating app. 151 One of us has 
written that privacy law could help generate and protect norms of trust among 
individuals. 152 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the Euro-
pean Union’s comprehensive data privacy law, and the California Consumer 
Privacy Act both guarantee individuals the right to access information about 
them stored by data collectors. 153 Those provisions have required companies 
to redesign their databases and user interfaces to allow data requests, searches, 
and transmission. 154 And Margot Kaminski has suggested that one of the goals 
of compliance requirements in the GDPR, including privacy impact assess-
ments and other internal structures, is to nudge behavioral and design norms 
inside the information industry. 155 These are just a few examples of how law 
is part of the process by which new technologies are interpreted, constructed, 
and understood in society. 
III. CHALLENGING NORM RELIANCE AND JUDICIAL NONINTERVENTION IN 
FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW 
When norms seem stable and settled, judges often use them to define our 
Fourth Amendment rights; when norms appear to be in flux, judges fre-
quently leave them to evolve on their own, free of oversight or regulation. That 
is our descriptive claim. In this Part, we make our normative claim: both these 
practices substantially weaken the ability of the Fourth Amendment to protect 
privacy, security, and equality in the information age. 
As discussed above, law not only draws on social norms but also shapes 
them, in an ongoing exchange between social institutions and individuals. 
Courts deciding Fourth Amendment cases have often failed to appreciate the 
expressive function of law and its role in driving norms. Courts regularly take 
norms to be settled, even in areas where they are contested or directly influ-
enced by legal standards. 
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This failure of understanding leads to concrete judicial errors in the 
Fourth Amendment context. First, courts may embed outmoded or problem-
atic norms in Fourth Amendment law, even as many of those norms discrim-
inate on the basis of race, gender, or class. Second, courts often refrain from 
addressing government surveillance when the norms surrounding a new tech-
nology are unsettled. This practice allows the government to surveil citizens 
without regulation for years or decades. Moreover, it cedes power over norm 
development to companies that design new technologies based on an extrac-
tive data-for-profit business model, thus skewing social norms toward disclo-
sure and away from privacy. Finally, both the closure and nonintervention 
principles described above facilitate “surveillance creep,” or using existing 
data-gathering structures for new types of surveillance. 
Relying on the sociolegal and STS literatures described above, we chal-
lenge the principles of closure and nonintervention that drive these judicial 
errors. The following Sections detail how courts have embedded discrimina-
tory norms, ceded power over norm development to data-extractive busi-
nesses, and failed to anticipate the gradual accretion of government-
surveillance infrastructure. 
A. The Problem of Discriminatory Norms 
Social norms are rarely fully settled and are subject to contestation and 
change. Norms surrounding race, gender, class, and related issues are partic-
ularly likely to be challenged and to shift over time. 156 Courts adopting the 
closure principle and applying “settled” social norms are thus at risk of reify-
ing outmoded, discriminatory concepts. This Section explores this process, 
detailing how courts’ seemingly neutral applications of existing norms have 
embedded discriminatory ideas in Fourth Amendment law. 
1. Racially Discriminatory Norms 
Courts basing Fourth Amendment law on prevailing social customs may 
entrench discriminatory norms that disadvantage citizens of color. In the Su-
preme Court’s norm-based Fourth Amendment cases, the Court often looks 
to social practices as an objective basis for rules governing police–citizen in-
teractions. Its assessments of prevailing social customs might be empirically 
accurate—most people may act as the Court predicts. But the very act of en-
shrining social norms in constitutional law can reinforce discriminatory 
norms and make it more difficult for citizens to challenge them. Further, a 
demographically unrepresentative Supreme Court and lower federal courts 
relying on their “own knowledge and experience” may fail to understand how 
 
 156. As Jamelia Morgan notes in a forthcoming paper, norms of behavior employed by 
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norms can operate differently with respect to race, gender, class, and the in-
tersection thereof. 157 
In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Court concluded that the police could stop and 
frisk a Black suspect who ran away after seeing several police cars. 158 The po-
lice made a “commonsense judgement[] . . . about human behavior,” the 
Court said, and found that running away from police was suspicious and in-
dicative of wrongdoing. 159 Several justices in dissent pointed out that Black 
people have legitimate fears of police brutality and other harms stemming 
from police interaction that may cause them to flee at the sight of officers even 
without having done anything wrong.160 But the majority concluded that 
Wardlow’s fleeing behavior was sufficiently unusual as to arouse suspicion 
and thus the officers’ actions were justified. 161 
Empirical studies cast doubt on the idea that people fleeing the police are 
regularly engaged in wrongdoing. 162 But the problem here is not the Court’s 
empirical conclusion about how usual it is for a person to run away after see-
ing the police. It is the Court’s failure to question prevailing social practices of 
police–citizen interaction, particularly with respect to persons of color, before 
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embedding them in constitutional law. Running away upon seeing a police 
officer is likely rare overall in part because of substantial racial disparities in 
police treatment of civilians. 163 White people have less reason to fear police 
brutality or degradation, and thus less reason to run away. 164 Black people may 
decline to run away in most cases not because they are unafraid of the police 
but because they fear even more what the police will do to them if they flee. 165 
Declining to run may also reflect parental advice to children of color that dis-
courages running in the view of a police officer and counsels maximal com-
pliance in order to minimize the risk of being harmed by the police. 166 The 
Court, in other words, bases Fourth Amendment law on a prevailing social 
practice without asking why that practice exists. Nor does it ask whether the 
law should work to change that practice. In doing so, it embeds a practice with 
racially disparate effects into constitutional law. 
In United States v. Drayton, several police officers boarded a Greyhound 
bus, guarding the exits, while one officer asked to search Drayton’s bag and 
pat down his clothes. 167 The Court’s conclusion that this was not a seizure 
rested on the idea that bus passengers would generally feel free to decline po-
lice requests to search their bags and would leave the bus if they wanted to 
terminate the encounter. 168 The Court noted that most people complied with 
such requests, presumably out of a desire to promote law enforcement and 
enhance safety. 169 Setting aside whether the Court was correct about the pre-
vailing social practice of complying with police search requests, the Court 
failed to examine why this social norm exists. 
Like other members of traditionally marginalized groups, Black people 
may be especially reluctant to challenge police authority or decline police re-
quests in a situation like the one in Drayton, where Drayton, a Black man, was 
surrounded by officers in a confined space. 170 Black children are often coun-
seled by parents and other trusted figures to defer to the police as much as 
possible, not to move or flee, and to comply with every request. 171 Thus a 
standard like Drayton’s, which depends on a person refusing to talk to police 
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officers or brushing past them to leave a bus, may be harmful to people of 
color who cannot assert their rights to noncompliance with police requests 
without risking serious harm or trauma. 172 Moreover, psychological studies of 
consent in law enforcement contexts suggest that compliance with police 
search requests is generally motivated by intimidation rather than the volun-
tary choices of citizens. 173 
Even if a court ultimately concludes that the coercive pressure of police 
bus interdiction is justified by the benefits of searching passengers’ bags, 174 it 
should not do so without addressing the disparate racial and ethnic impacts 
of such an approach. 175 Yet the Court never grapples with these normative 
questions, instead choosing to identify a prevailing social practice and adopt 
it as settled. 
2. Gender-Discriminatory Norms 
The Supreme Court has overlooked gendered differences in responses to 
police stops and embedded potentially gender-discriminatory norms in the 
law governing consent searches. Norm-based standards that depend on indi-
viduals refusing to comply with police officers disadvantage women relative 
to men. Survey data suggests that women feel less free to leave police–citizen 
encounters and may feel the coercive pressure of such encounters more than 
others. 176 Linguistic patterns correlated with gender may also result in 
women, particularly women of color, being less direct with authority figures 
in ways that may disadvantage them under facially neutral standards of nor-
mal police–citizen interaction. 177 
Moreover, the jurisprudence of consent searches of homes may reinforce 
existing norms of domestic privacy at the expense of deterring domestic abuse. 
The multiple opinions in Georgia v. Randolph parallel an ongoing feminist 
debate about privacy and domestic abuse without actually addressing it. 178 
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Some theorists have argued against the concept of domestic privacy, contend-
ing that it provides a cover for physical and psychological abuse. 179 Others 
have argued that once the law takes a full account of the privacy and bodily 
integrity interests of women, the law’s general concern for domestic privacy 
need not shield abusers or prevent government officials from scrutinizing the 
home in appropriate circumstances. 180 
The Supreme Court majority largely elided this debate by focusing on social 
norms and concluding that prevailing norms discourage entering a dwelling 
when a tenant of that dwelling is present and objects to one’s entry. 181 The jus-
tices were aware of the domestic-abuse issue when they made their decision. 182 
But in setting a general standard, the Court concluded that it should follow its 
typical practice of giving “great significance . . . to widely shared social expec-
tations” and “social custom” in Fourth Amendment consent cases. 183 
Adopting these social norms, however well intentioned, enshrines them 
in constitutional law without fully addressing their gendered burdens and im-
plications for victims and survivors of abuse. While the police would be able 
to enter a house in situations of domestic violence, they may not, under Ran-
dolph, be able to do so in cases where violence is not imminent or where the 
signs of abuse are too ambiguous to allow for entry on the basis of an emer-
gency-aid exception. 184 Likewise, the Randolph rule prohibits police involve-
ment in cases of domestic strife that may act as a precursor to abuse or may 
implicate child custody. 185 
Randolph’s protection of domestic privacy and reluctance to involve po-
lice officers in nonabusive domestic disputes may ultimately represent the op-
timal approach to Fourth Amendment consent law. But the Court’s adoption 
of prevailing social norms drowns out the debate about the broader implica-
tions of its ruling. The Court privileges a norm of social behavior that was 
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 185. Indeed, the reason for the initial phone call to the police in Randolph was Scott Ran-
dolph’s taking his and Janet Randolph’s son out of the house to live elsewhere. Randolph, 547 
U.S. at 107. 
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developed when gender relations were substantially different than they are to-
day and when women’s rights to autonomy and bodily integrity in the domes-
tic context were devalued. 186 Endorsing norms simply because of their 
longstanding nature or general acceptance risks embedding discriminatory 
norms in constitutional law. 187 
3. Class-Discriminatory Norms 
Courts’ adoptions of existing social customs in Fourth Amendment law 
can also embed norms that systematically disadvantage poorer citizens and 
privilege those with more money or property. Class-discriminatory norms 
may also have racially disparate impacts, doubly disadvantaging poor people 
of color. 188 The cases adopting these norms uncritically adopt prevailing social 
practices and entrench stereotypes about wealth and power. 
For example, while courts have held that individuals have a Fourth 
Amendment interest in the yards surrounding their detached homes or the 
shared areas of small multiunit homes, 189 courts typically hold that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect the hallways of larger apartment buildings. 190 
 
 186. The social norm of nonentry over the objection of a tenant likely stretches back dec-
ades or centuries, and Randolph points to related legal authorities from the 1960s, 1950s, and 
earlier. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 112, 114 (first citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 
610 (1961); then citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); and then citing 2 HERBERT 
THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 468, 473–74, at 297, 307–309 (Basil Jones 
ed., 3d ed. 1939)). These were decades that prioritized privacy and the maintenance of family 
structure over the prevention of domestic abuse. See Siegel, supra note 178, at 2170–71. 
 187. Note that the Supreme Court’s preferences for same-gender searches also entrench 
problematic norms in Fourth Amendment law. I. Bennett Capers, Unsexing the Fourth Amend-
ment, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 863–65 (2015). 
 188. See Eric J. Miller, Property, Persons, and Institutionalized Police Interdiction in Byrd 
v. United States, 52 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 107, 156 (2018). 
 189. E.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018) (finding a Fourth Amendment 
violation when police officers entered a home’s curtilage to examine a motorcycle parked there); 
United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding that tenants had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a small multiunit home “[i]n light of the size of the building” and “the 
fact that the door to the hallway giving access to the two apartments was locked”); Fixel v. Wain-
wright, 492 F.2d 480, 483–84 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a police officer’s unwarranted inspec-
tion of the shared backyard of a four-unit apartment house violated the Fourth Amendment). 
 190. E.g., United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The vestibule 
and other common areas are used by postal carriers, custodians, and peddlers.”); United States 
v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1977) (“The common hallways of Hoff’s apartment building 
were available for the use of residents and their guests, the landlord and his agents, and others 
having legitimate reasons to be on the premises.”); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 
(9th Cir. 1993) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment hallway); United 
States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1989) (same), abrogated on other grounds by 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990). But see United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 549–
50 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that uninvited police entry into the hallway of a locked apartment 
building violated the Fourth Amendment on quasi-trespass grounds). 
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This distinction is based on judges’ perceptions of the social practices sur-
rounding these areas. 191 A homeowner “exercises greater control” over their 
yard than apartment dwellers do over their hallways, and, because larger 
apartments generally receive more visitors, “[t]he more units in the apartment 
building, . . . the less reasonable any expectation of privacy.” 192 This might be 
a defensible assessment of social practices, although visitors and delivery people 
may intrude on a homeowner’s yard as well. But this distinction discriminates 
between those who own detached houses and those who cannot afford such 
houses (or those who simply wish to live in cities). The former, who are likely 
wealthier, enjoy stronger privacy rights. Courts could just as plausibly find 
that all dwellings are surrounded by a private area, typically open to a limited 
set of guests and visitors, and off-limits to warrantless police surveillance.193 In-
stead, subtle distinctions between the social practices surrounding yards and 
hallways have driven the case outcomes, despite their disparate impacts.194 
The Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Delgado likewise enshrined class-
discriminatory norms in the context of immigration enforcement at a gar-
ment factory. 195 The Court concluded that placing armed agents near the fac-
tory’s exits did not constitute a seizure of the workers inside. 196 This holding 
was based on the Court’s assessment of the typical social practices of a factory. 
It found that “when people are at work their freedom to move about has been 
meaningfully restricted . . . by the workers’ voluntary obligations to their em-
ployers.” 197 While this may be an accurate assessment of the practices of many 
garment factories, where workers may have little bargaining power and may 
face excessive work demands and restrictions on personal breaks, it endorses 
an aggressively antiworker norm. 198 The rationale of Delgado is that workers 
 
 191. Judges tend to be wealthier than the average American. Compare SEMEGA ET AL., su-
pra note 157 (noting that the median U.S. household income for 2019 was $68,703), with Judicial 
Compensation, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation 
[perma.cc/T5XX-EZ85] (noting that the lowest judicial compensation in 2021 was $218,600, for 
district judges). They are also more homogeneously white than the general population. See, e.g., 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, EXAMINING THE DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITIONS OF U.S. CIRCUIT AND 
DISTRICT COURTS (2020), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2020/02/12075802
/Judicial-Diversity-Circuit-District-Courts.pdf [perma.cc/87B5-L3KB]. Judges’ perceptions of the 
practices that prevail in urban apartment buildings may be subject to question. Even if judges’ 
social assessments are correct, the results are strongly class biased and should be subject to nor-
mative reassessment. 
 192. United States v. Miravalles, 280 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 193. Indeed, the leading case on drug-sniffing dogs points in this direction, although its 
rationale is difficult to square with the many cases declaring that there is no Fourth Amendment 
interest in a shared hallway. See United States v. Whitaker, 820 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 194. See generally William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265 (1999). 
 195. See 466 U.S. 210, 212 (1984); Carbado, supra note 170, at 993–94. 
 196. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 212. 
 197. Id. at 218. 
 198. Cf. Leslie D. Alexander, Note, Fashioning a New Approach: The Role of International 
Human Rights Law in Enforcing Rights of Women Garment Workers in Los Angeles, 10 GEO. J. 
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are already obligated to remain inside the factory for the duration of the work-
day, with little enough personal freedom that the additional restrictions im-
posed by armed guards do not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment 
seizure. 199 The Court adopts this norm as a lodestar of Fourth Amendment 
law without questioning its appropriateness or desirability. In doing so, it re-
inforces disciplinarian workplace norms and further undermines workers’ 
power relative to their employers. It also places disproportionate burdens on 
Latinx workers and may reduce their relative status as workers. 200 The Court’s 
adoption of existing workplace norms can have harmful legal and social im-
plications for workers along several dimensions. 
B. The Effects of Nonintervention 
The previous Section discussed how courts applying the closure principle 
have ignored law’s role in nudging norms and have entrenched unjust and 
outdated norms about race, gender, and socioeconomic status in Fourth 
Amendment law. The flip side of closure is nonintervention, or courts declin-
ing to take action when they perceive that social norms—particularly those 
about the uses of surveillance technologies—are still in flux. Judicial insistence 
on nonintervention when norms are perceived to be unsettled—what we are 
calling the nonintervention principle—cedes power to private companies that 
design new technologies to surveil users rather than protect their privacy. 
Technology companies support norms that favor surveillance, in line with the 
data-extractive business models of informational capitalism. 201 In addition, 
nonintervention often permits the government to surveil individuals using 
new technologies for years or decades without meaningful legal regulation. 
1. Nonintervention and Government Surveillance 
In general, choosing not to act is a choice like any other. It has both con-
sequences and moral valence, and it reflects the normative judgment of the 
decisionmaker. 202 Judicial nonintervention is also a choice—one that can per-
petuate existing injustices. 203 For example, judicial adherence to a decontex-
tualized form of race and sex neutrality has often undermined prospects for 
 
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 81, 83–87 (2003) (discussing inhumane conditions and excessive work 
obligations in garment factories). 
 199. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218. 
 200. Carbado, supra note 170, at 998. 
 201. See COHEN, supra note 22. 
 202. For a general theoretical discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Choosing Not to Choose, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1, 5–8 (2014). 
 203. This sentiment is often expressed by adherents of movements for social justice. As 
Desmond Tutu remarked, “If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side 
of the oppressor.” Gary Younge, The Secrets of a Peacemaker, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2009, 7:01 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/may/23/interview-desmond-tutu [perma.cc/QUF4-
2GPC]. To be sure, judicial nonintervention can often promote social justice as effectively as 
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justice. 204 Similarly, when courts stay out of the fray entirely, they may let po-
litical majorities entrench their own power at the expense of minority voters. 205 
Proponents of judicial nonintervention in Fourth Amendment law sug-
gest that courts should refrain from regulating the government’s use of a new 
surveillance technology until social norms and practices involving the tech-
nology become stable. 206 Under this laissez-faire regime, norms surrounding 
emerging technologies should be allowed to develop free of judicial input. As 
a result, government officials would be allowed to surveil citizens without 
Fourth Amendment regulation in the long interim period between the devel-
opment of a new technology and the development of relatively stable social 
norms. As courts wait for a technology and its associated norms to settle, non-
intervention in surveillance cases will typically mean declining to reach the 
merits of a Fourth Amendment issue, ruling narrowly, or, at the Supreme 
Court level, simply denying certiorari. 207 
This approach is problematic because norms rarely definitively settle, 208 
and it may take several years or decades for technologies and norms to stabi-
lize even partially. 209 The period of “interpretive flexibility” surrounding a 
new technology is often quite long, as different social groups and actors fight 
to adapt new technologies to their needs, values, and worldviews. It took the 
bicycle nearly 100 years to evolve from its first iterations to suit the needs of 
 
intervention, or even more so. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008). 
 204. For instance, nonintervention historically permitted even severe forms of domestic 
abuse. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453, 457 (1868). 
 205. In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Roberts Court interpreted the political question doc-
trine to mandate nonintervention in partisan gerrymandering claims. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–08 
(2019). Notwithstanding the dissent’s step-by-step approach for adjudication, the Court left the 
work of overturning partisan gerrymanders to the political sphere. See id. at 2509–25 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). But gerrymanders are designed to prevent political checks; they entrench the power 
of one party (or group) against the popular will. Judicial nonintervention in partisan gerrymander-
ing cases, then, leaves minority parties with nowhere to turn, perpetuating the unequal status quo. 
 206. See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (“The judiciary risks error 
by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before 
its role in society has become clear.”); Kerr, supra note 23, at 539 (“If a court intervenes too soon, 
it risks error: it might wrongly assess the need for adjustment because either the technology 
hasn’t evolved to a reasonably stable state or else social practices relating to the use of the tech-
nology continue to evolve.”). 
 207. Lower courts have several means of avoiding difficult Fourth Amendment issues, in-
cluding dismissing cases on standing, good-faith, or qualified-immunity grounds. See, e.g., 
Sherry F. Colb, Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion and Standing Can No 
Longer Logically Coexist, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663, 1670–73 (2007) (giving a general theoretical 
account of modern standing doctrine); Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1084–87 (2011) (surveying the Supreme Court’s good-
faith-exception jurisprudence). Lower courts might also rule narrowly, or reach a ruling only in 
unpublished, nonprecedential decisions when permitted by local rules. See, e.g., WASH. GEN. R. 
14.1 (establishing that unpublished opinions of the Washington Court of Appeals “have no prec-
edential value”). 
 208. See supra Section II.A. 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 133–139. 
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different social groups. 210 The telephone is still evolving. 211 By the time soci-
otechnical norms stabilize, if they do at all, the government will have had free 
reign to surveil citizens for a long time. 
Proponents of nonintervention have argued that the Supreme Court’s er-
roneous ruling in Olmstead v. United States, which upheld warrantless wire-
tapping, was the result of the Court intervening too fast to rule on a relatively 
new form of surveillance. 212 They suggest that the Court could instead have 
waited another twenty or thirty years as “the use of the telephone in commu-
nications continued to change throughout the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.” 213 But 
declining to intervene for several decades would have given the government 
the ability to massively surveil citizens without judicial supervision through-
out that time, rendering the Fourth Amendment toothless. 214 Moreover, both 
the telephone and the practice of wiretapping were well known for decades 
prior to Olmstead. 215 The Court’s error in Olmstead was not the result of tech-
nological unfamiliarity or a failure to wait for norms to settle but rather of 
excessive formalism and textual literalism. 216 
By failing to intervene when issues of technological surveillance arise, 
courts allow government surveillance to go unchecked by the Fourth Amend-
ment for years or decades. Further, by the time sociotechnical norms become 
relatively stable, the government may have already moved on to a new surveil-
lance practice, beginning the cycle again. As the next Section explores, nonin-
tervention can also facilitate the creation of antiprivacy norms by ceding norm 
development to private entities with business models built on data extraction. 
 
 210. See BIJKER, supra note 143, at 19–21. 
 211. See W.H. Martin, Seventy-Five Years of the Telephone: An Evolution in Technology, 30 
BELL SYS. TECH. J. 215, 234 (1951); see also, e.g., Lisa Eadicicco, This Is Why the iPhone Upended 
the Tech Industry, TIME (June 29, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://time.com/4837176/iphone-10th-an-
niversary [perma.cc/T5DB-NDQH]. 
 212. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Ber-
ger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 213. Kerr, supra note 23, at 539. 
 214. Six years after Olmstead, Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934, section 
605 of which limited the disclosure of wiretapping evidence in court but which did not effectively 
deter widespread use and abuse of wiretapping over the following decades. See Communications 
Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103–04 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)); 
Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 592 (2011) 
(describing the widespread abuses that occurred during the decades that followed the passage of 
the Communications Act of 1934). 
 215. The telephone was patented in 1876, some fifty-two years prior to Olmstead, U.S. Pa-
tent No. 174,465 (filed Feb. 14, 1876), while wiretapping had been used since 1895, thirty-three 
years prior to Olmstead. Meyer Berger, Tapping the Wires, NEW YORKER (June 11, 1938), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1938/06/18/tapping-the-wires [perma.cc/X75Q-PCLJ]. 
Wiretapping had been brought to public attention by at least 1916, twelve years before Olmstead. 
Id. 
 216. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473–74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s 
rigidly textual approach to addressing novel government surveillance). 
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2. Informational Capitalism and Antiprivacy Norms 
Courts’ absence from the social construction of new technologies ampli-
fies designers’ power to set sociotechnical norms. Design can influence, 
nudge, and predetermine our disclosure behavior by triggering the heuristics 
we use to make decisions. 217 When design makes things easier to do (like dis-
closing personal information), we do more of it; when design makes things 
harder to do (like protect our privacy), we do less of it. 218 Design also expresses 
values, telling the stories designers want by controlling their technology’s “se-
mantic architecture.” 219 
Design is, in other words, a means of exercising power. 220 As Woodrow 
Hartzog notes, “The realities of technology at scale mean that the services we 
use must necessarily be built in a way that constraints [sic] our choices.” 221 
We can only click on the buttons or select the options presented to us; we can 
only opt out of the options from which a website allows us to opt out. 
The power of design is generally leveraged to increase data collection, use, 
and processing. That is what “informational capitalism” refers to: a political 
economy in which data equals profit. 222 Scholars have argued that this need 
for data stems from the marketing industry’s quest to better predict consumer 
responses to advertisements. With the popularization of the World Wide 
Web, marketers sliced and diced populations into as many latent characteris-
tics as possible so as to better “understand” what consumers want.223 Likewise, 
it is in the economic interests of tech industry executives to guide the design 
process toward surveillance. Executives at public companies also have legal 
 
 217. See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT 26–30 (2018); see also Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
 218. CLIVE THOMPSON, CODERS: THE MAKING OF A NEW TRIBE AND THE REMAKING OF 
THE WORLD 11 (2019). 
 219. See MARY FLANAGAN & HELEN NISSENBAUM, VALUES AT PLAY IN DIGITAL GAMES 33 
(2014). 
 220. As Langdon Winner argued, it is difficult to understand design independent of its 
coercive capacities and political dynamics. Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 
DAEDALUS, Winter 1980, at 121, 122–23; see also, e.g., Mary Flanagan, Daniel C. Howe & Helen 
Nissenbaum, Embodying Values in Technology: Theory and Practice, in INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 322 (Jeroen van den Hoven & John Weckert eds., 
2008); BATYA FRIEDMAN & DAVID G. HENDRY, VALUE SENSITIVE DESIGN: SHAPING 
TECHNOLOGY WITH MORAL IMAGINATION (2019); Julie E. Cohen, Essay, Cyberspace as/and 
Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 223 (2007); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formula-
tion of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998). 
 221. Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 
423, 426 (2018). 
 222. See COHEN, supra note 22, at 5–6. 
 223. See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY YOU: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS 
DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH (2011); JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING UP AMERICA: 
ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW MEDIA WORLD (1997). 
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obligations to pursue profits for shareholders, further incenting data extrac-
tion. 224 For their part, many software engineers, a necessarily powerful group 
because of the position they occupy at the center of design’s translation from 
concept to code, are rarely trained in, nor are they particularly cognizant of, 
privacy. 225 The incentives and attitudes of those doing the work of design and 
those directing the process from the C-Suite prejudice design against privacy 
from the beginning. We see this throughout the digital ecosystem. Many 
smartphone apps collect geolocation data for reasons unrelated to improving 
user experience; 226 interfaces encourage disclosure and frame sharing in a pos-
itive light; 227 so-called “dark patterns” take advantage of our preference for 
shiny colorful buttons over grey ones; 228 platforms nudge us to buy products 
others have bought before us; 229 and apps gamify sharing by encouraging us 
to continue a “streak” with our friends. 230 
In many cases, users have little power to react in ways contrary to or in-
consistent with design. 231 Design, therefore, is a powerful norm generator. As 
Hartzog explains, “Once design affects our perceptions, it begins to shape our 
behavior. Once it shapes our behavior, it can be used to control us because it 
shapes what we perceive as normal.” 232 Therefore, courts that adopt the non-
intervention principle leave the arena in which social norms are contested to 
these powerful forces of design, almost all of which privilege surveillance over 
privacy. 
 
 224. See Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 
HARV. L. REV. 497, 503–05 (2019). 
 225. Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 681 (2018). 
 226. E.g., Tim Sampson, Popular Flashlight App Secretly Collected and Sold Users’ Location 
Data, DAILY DOT (June 1, 2021, 12:23 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/debug/flashlight-app-
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 227. See Leslie K. John, Alessandro Acquisti & George Loewenstein, Strangers on a Plane: 
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(2011). 
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GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug
/08/amazon-algorithm-curated-misinformation-books-data [perma.cc/NZ9V-HN9G]. 
 230. E.g., Jay Peters, A Snapchat-Owned Location App Just Added a Leaderboard Compar-
ing Who Stays Home the Most, VERGE (Mar. 24, 2020, 3:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com
/2020/3/24/21192741/snapchat-zenly-app-stay-at-home-leaderboard-coronavirus-social-dis-
tancing [perma.cc/6MNC-S7N6] (discussing an app that typically encourages users to share 
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 232. HARTZOG, supra note 217, at 42. 
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Technology companies also market their products to encourage sharing. 
Social platforms promise to “bring people together,” but only if users share 
their likes and dislikes. 233 Dating apps advertise the most accurate matches, 
but only if users answer hundreds of intimate questions. 234 The multibillion-
dollar femtech industry markets its products as enhancing women’s health 
and sexual enjoyment while collecting intimate data on its users and often 
selling that data to third parties. 235 And artificial intelligence companies mar-
ket their algorithms with highly dubious claims of predictive accuracy, ampli-
fying their “imperative” to collect data. 236 
Combined with courts’ deferential approach to sociotechnical norms, the 
information industry’s exercise of its data-extractive powers has direct and 
deleterious effects on the ability of the Fourth Amendment to protect privacy. 
When courts decline to resolve Fourth Amendment cases on the merits be-
cause social norms are in flux, the norms that eventually emerge will not be 
neutral or organically developed by autonomous actors. Rather, those norms 
will be shaped by the companies that control product marketing and design, 
filtered through those companies’ profit-maximizing interests in undermin-
ing privacy. Over time, the process of nonintervention, antiprivacy norm for-
mation, and judicial application of “settled” norms systematically biases social 
norms against privacy. 
We can observe a similar process unfolding in the lower courts. The Su-
preme Court has not yet weighed in on the privacy expectations, if any, asso-
ciated with social media websites such as Facebook. In the absence of clear 
direction, lower courts addressing the issue “have held that whether the 
Fourth Amendment applies to a user’s Facebook content ‘depends, inter alia, 
on the user’s privacy settings.’ ” 237 In practice, courts have placed a burden of 
proof on defendants to demonstrate that their privacy settings are rigorous 
 
 233. Mark Zuckerberg, Bringing the World Closer Together, FACEBOOK (Mar. 15, 2021, 
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 237. United States v. Westley, No. 17-cr-171, 2018 WL 3448161, at *6 (D. Conn. July 17, 
2018) (quoting United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)); see also 
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privacy restrictions on his Facebook account). 
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enough to justify Fourth Amendment protection. 238 This would typically re-
quire more than just restricting Facebook posts to one’s friends. 239 But, over 
the past fifteen years, Facebook has notoriously made it difficult for its users 
to effectively use their privacy settings or limit the dissemination of their 
posts. 240 This is intentional, a design tactic aimed at enhancing disclosure and 
feeding a business model based on behavioral advertising. 241 And there is little 
question about Facebook’s preferences for norms among its users—Mark 
Zuckerberg has stated explicitly that keeping personal information private 
online is no longer the “social norm.” 242 The company has also consistently 
advanced the legal position that its users have no privacy interests in any in-
formation they share with Facebook. 243 When the Supreme Court eventually 
weighs in on social media privacy, it will do so in an environment shaped by 
Facebook and its aggressively antiprivacy design and practices. 
C. Surveillance Creep 
Judicial norm reliance and nonintervention also facilitate surveillance 
creep. Surveillance creep occurs when a device designed for one type of infor-
mation gathering ends up being used for more invasive purposes. 244 Courts 
relying heavily on social norms may be less likely to regulate invasive uses of 
familiar and generally accepted technologies. 
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FACEBOOK (Mar. 28, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/03/privacy-shortcuts [perma.cc
/T6N2-KYPN] (acknowledging that its privacy settings remain difficult for many users to find); 
Facebook, Inc., 154 F.T.C. 1, 7–10 (2012) (describing how Facebook manipulated and hid its 
privacy settings to make it difficult or impossible for its users to restrict the dissemination of 
their information). 
 241. See HARTZOG, supra note 217, at 26–30. 
 242. Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010, 8:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/fa-
cebook-privacy [perma.cc/STD5-HJBP]. 
 243. See, e.g., Transcript of Proc. at 7, In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Priv. User Profile 
Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 18-md-02843); Campbell v. Facebook, Inc., 951 
F.3d 1106, 1119 n.9 (9th Cir. 2020); Appellee’s Brief at 21, Smith v. Facebook, Inc., 745 F. App’x 
8 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-16206). 
 244. See BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 20-21 (2018). 
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Surveillance creep is related to the engineering concept “function creep,” 
where a device designed for one purpose ends up being used for another. 245 
For example, wearable health trackers like the Fitbit or the Apple Watch may 
have originally been used to count steps, but they can also be deployed by 
health insurance companies, schools, or workplaces to determine eligibility for 
discounts, liability for injury, or access to opportunities. 246 Integrating GPS into 
a mobile dating app can tell users about potential matches near them, but it 
can also be used to triangulate the precise location of queer people hiding from 
abusive communities, families, or governments. 247 And a camera at a four-
way intersection may have originally been installed to photograph the license 
plates of speeders or those who drive through red lights, but it also enables the 
government to monitor pedestrians using facial recognition technology. 248 
Far from a hypothetical or speculative concern, these kinds of surveillance 
creep are already here. During antiracism protests in May and June 2020, po-
lice in San Diego used streetlight sensors and cameras, previously installed to 
capture transit and environmental data, to identify, harass, and prosecute pro-
testors. 249 And face scans, once an isolated security tool, are now being used 
in place of boarding passes at airports, with the attendant databases of faces 
providing even more opportunities for surveillance. 250 Existing tracking tools 
 
 245. Bruce Schneier, Security and Function Creep, IEEE SEC. & PRIV., Jan./Feb. 2010, at 88, 
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WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews
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KE64]; Mark Joseph Stern, This Daily Beast Grindr Stunt Is Sleazy, Dangerous, and Wildly Un-
ethical, SLATE (Aug. 11, 2016, 10:48 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2016/08/the-daily-
beasts-olympics-grindr-stunt-is-dangerous-and-unethical.html [perma.cc/GW23-97MV]. 
 248. See Tracy Qu, Next Time You Go Through a Red Light in China Its Growing Facial 
Recognition Network May Catch You Out, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 15, 2019, 8:30 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/tech/innovation/article/3022961/next-time-you-go-through-red-light-
china-its-growing-facial [perma.cc/Q6FV-2U32] (“In the hi-tech city of Shenzhen, jaywalkers 
have already been named-and-shamed by pilot facial recognition schemes.”). 
 249. Jesse Marx, Police Used Smart Streetlight Footage to Investigate Protesters, VOICE OF 
SAN DIEGO (June 29, 2020), https://www.voiceofsandiego.org/topics/government/police-used-
smart-streetlight-footage-to-investigate-protesters [perma.cc/FJ3B-KVDE]. 
 250. Dan Reed, Your Face Is Your Passport: Biometrics Could Enable Explosive Travel Growth, 
but Critics Fret About Privacy Loss, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com
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being repurposed for COVID-19 contact tracing are another example of ever-
expanding surveillance. 251 
Surveillance creep has a subtle yet powerful impact on sociotechnical 
norms because it normalizes surveillance as ordinary, routine, and expected. 
Data tracking in schools may offer administrators quantitative metrics for 
evaluating student success, but its use habituates young people to third-party 
data collection. 252 The launch of facial recognition cameras in London pre-
pares the ground for “wider public acceptance of a . . . rights-hostile technol-
ogy via a gradual building out process.” 253 GPS technology may be helpful for 
tourists navigating new cities or to help drivers find the fastest route home, 
but it also routinizes the experience of other people knowing where you are at 
all times and adjusts our expectations about others’ access to our data. 254 
It is also relatively easy for information-age devices to take on new sur-
veillance capabilities: tablets, wearables, mobile apps, and so-called “smart” 
devices can be updated via wireless uploads in the background while no one 
is looking. 255 This contrasts with the significant effort involved in updating 
industrial-age devices; installing a CD player or an airbag or a sunroof in an 
old car, for example, required taking a trip to a repair shop, physically decon-
structing part of the vehicle, and putting it back together. Whereas the obvious 
effort involved in the latter emphasized the significance of the change, the ease 
of the former suggests its ordinariness. 
By relying on precedents involving older technologies to justify the use of 
newer, more advanced surveillance, courts unwittingly fall prey to the nor-
malization effect of surveillance creep in Fourth Amendment cases. That is, 
courts may focus only on the marginal change to an existing technology, 
which will often seem anodyne or minimal. That narrow focus obscures the 
new practice’s entire effect on privacy interests. Therefore, courts may allow 
intense surveillance to escape Fourth Amendment scrutiny. For example, in 
United States v. White, the Supreme Court ruled that undercover agents could 
record private conversations inside a suspect’s home, relying on prior rulings 
permitting undercover agents without recording devices to enter a home. 256 
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iket Kesari & Aaron Perzanowski, The Tethered Economy, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 783, 785 (2019). 
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Because the additional intrusion of a recording device was relatively small, 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy against it. 257 Once one form of 
surveillance got its foot in the door of people’s homes, additional surveillance 
became easier to justify. 
In United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that government 
agents could monitor an individual’s internet account and capture his email 
to/from data, the IP addresses of the websites he visited, and the total volume 
of data sent to his account.258 A prior case had allowed the police to use a de-
vice known as a “pen register” to tap a suspect’s phone lines and collect the 
numbers that he dialed. 259 Given the legality of telephone pen registers, the 
government could “install a pen register analogue” to monitor a person’s in-
ternet traffic without triggering the Fourth Amendment. 260 The court ignored 
the substantially greater quantity and intimacy of internet data, 261 concluding 
instead that internet users do not reasonably expect privacy in their internet 
use any more than they do in their telephone use. 262 
In each of these cases, the courts’ approval of early forms of surveillance 
was used to justify the subsequent use of more advanced forms of surveillance. 
Courts presumed that individuals had accepted surveillance as normal, then 
allowed government monitoring to creep one step further. 
IV. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 
Courts’ reliance on existing norms, as well as their failure to intervene in 
cases where norms are unsettled, has led to several substantial errors in Fourth 
Amendment law. That is not to say that norms have no place in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. But rather than simply adopting existing norms, 
courts should examine whether those norms are justifiable. And whether 
courts choose to get involved in the social construction of surveillance tech-
nologies or to stay out of the fray, they must do so appreciating the net sur-
veillance effects of nonintervention. 
Sociotechnical norms develop in an arena already skewed in favor of sur-
veillance. When courts avoid intervening where norms are in flux, the mech-
anisms of design and surveillance creep remain in place. Although technology 
companies are not the only institutions involved in the social construction of 
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new technologies, they are the most powerful: scholars have shown that indi-
viduals are, on average, ill equipped to resist nudges on their own, 263 and pri-
vacy-advocacy organizations are too small and underfunded to match the power 
of corporate interests. If the goal is to achieve an equilibrium between privacy 
and law enforcement needs, sociotechnical norms need a counterweight.264 
Courts are well suited to provide this counterweight. Although courts’ in-
stitutional interests are manifold, 265 those interests are generally not the same 
as the data-extractive interests of technology companies. Courts are also ca-
pable of stepping back, conceptualizing the balance between law enforcement 
and liberty, and making a dispassionate decision in keeping with what Daniel 
Meltzer once called the “special attributes of the judiciary.” 266 And courts are 
capable of protecting the rights of minority groups that lack sufficient voices 
in majoritarian politics. 267 By questioning the appropriateness of “settled” 
norms and intervening to protect citizens faced with new data-extractive tech-
nologies, courts may serve as a valuable counterweight to the antiprivacy in-
terests of governments and technology companies. 
In the following Sections, we explore new directions for Fourth Amend-
ment law that can help courts to intervene effectively in cases involving new 
technologies and avoid excessive norm reliance. We first examine the use of 
alternative Fourth Amendment paradigms that would allow courts to focus 
on the effects of surveillance rather than existing social norms. We then pro-
pose that courts use a modified form of stare decisis in Fourth Amendment 
cases involving emerging surveillance technologies, a field in which revisiting 
past decisions may be more necessary than in other areas. 268 Finally, we survey 
alternative institutional arrangements for regulating government surveillance 
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and consider how legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts might work 
together to effectively regulate government surveillance. 
A. New Fourth Amendment Paradigms 
Courts rely on existing social norms in virtually every aspect of Fourth 
Amendment law as they seek objective bases for their rulings on surveillance 
and policing. Dominant doctrinal paradigms facilitate this reliance on norms. 
The Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and the reasonableness-based 
standards for investigative stops and nonphysical seizures encourage courts to 
act as armchair sociologists, identifying and analyzing common social practices. 
There are, however, alternative paradigms that would largely avoid reli-
ance on social norms. In place of the reasonable expectation of privacy stand-
ard for searches, scholars have proposed more prescriptive standards that 
focus on the impacts of surveillance rather than its social valence. For example, 
one of us has argued that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is best un-
derstood as focusing on the intimacy, amount, and cost of a given act of sur-
veillance. 269 When surveillance targets an intimate place or thing, seeks a large 
amount of information, and/or is low in cost, it is more likely to be a Fourth 
Amendment search. 270 Such surveillance has deleterious effects regardless of 
current norms—it can interfere with relationships, give rise to law enforce-
ment abuses, and evade electoral accountability. 271 Other prescriptive ap-
proaches include those that overtly balance the chilling effects and 
psychological harms of surveillance against its benefits 272 and multifactor tests 
that identify constitutionally problematic forms of government observation.273 
Scholars have also suggested alternative paradigms for Fourth Amendment 
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reasonableness, including graduated tiers of reasonableness that offer a more 
nuanced approach to different kinds of government surveillance 274 or partially 
randomized searches that reduce police discretion and racial discrimination. 275 
By directly examining the effects or intensity of surveillance and not just 
its acceptance by society, these prescriptive approaches can lessen reliance on 
social norms in Fourth Amendment law. 276 Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence 
in Jones arguably endorses a more effects-based approach in regulating loca-
tion tracking, as do parts of the majority opinion in Carpenter. 277 Prescriptive 
paradigms for Fourth Amendment searches are also more compatible with 
early judicial interventions addressing new surveillance technologies because 
they are more adaptable to rapidly changing circumstances. 278 Moreover, 
many of these paradigms can help courts better address surveillance creep. 279 
Rather than relying on sociotechnical norms, these paradigms focus on the 
broader effects of government surveillance activities. As such, whether a sur-
veillance practice uses familiar infrastructure matters less under these ap-
proaches than under norm-reliant paradigms. 280 These approaches can help 
avoid the normalizing effects of incremental surveillance expansion. 
In addition, courts adopting prescriptive approaches to Fourth Amend-
ment law can take the possibility of surveillance creep into account when as-
sessing a new surveillance technology. If a new technology establishes a 
surveillance infrastructure that could easily be used for additional types of in-
formation gathering, that should weigh in favor of stronger Fourth Amendment 
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regulation of the technology. 281 For example, if license-plate-reading cameras, 
which may not themselves capture very sensitive data, could be repurposed to 
collect facial recognition data or infrared scans of car interiors, that should be 
a factor in a court’s decision whether to approve the cameras. Because addi-
tional uses of existing infrastructure are difficult to monitor, courts may be 
more effective at limiting the development of pervasive surveillance infra-
structure in the first instance. 282 
Of course, these types of forward-looking assessments of surveillance 
technologies may be difficult for courts, which are often limited in their tech-
nical knowledge and institutional capacity for balancing complex factors. 283 
Moreover, the conservative ideological tilt of the federal courts might skew 
judicial decisions in favor of law enforcement interests. 284 As we discuss in 
Section IV.C, another way to proactively address surveillance creep is to ex-
plore alternative institutional structures for surveillance regulation. 
B. Flexibility and Stare Decisis 
Because judges may be reluctant to regulate new surveillance technologies 
for fear of establishing erroneous precedents that are difficult to overturn, 
concerns about stare decisis can contribute to judicial nonintervention. 285 
While the power of horizontal stare decisis to actually bind judges is con-
tested, 286 the Supreme Court, at least, stands by its precedents far more often 
than it overrules them. 287 The force of precedent can deter the justices from 
questioning prior erroneous decisions,288 influence the Court’s grants of certio-
rari,289 and shape the cases that litigants appeal to the Court in the first place.290 
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Whatever its general power, stare decisis may be disfavored in certain sit-
uations, such as when a prior decision has proven unworkable 291 or when in-
dividuals are unlikely to rely on a prior decision in allocating resources. 292 Our 
analysis above suggests another area in which judges should be especially will-
ing to overturn existing precedents: cases involving surveillance technologies 
and related social practices. Courts should be willing to intervene when gov-
ernment entities employ a novel technology, even if the norms and practices 
surrounding the technology remain in flux. 293 But given the possibility of judi-
cial error in such cases, courts should embed flexibility in their Fourth 
Amendment decisions. 294 They should recognize that changing technological 
and social circumstances often necessitate overruling prior cases in this area. 295 
Judicial opinions might explicitly point toward flexibility by stating that 
their decisions may not apply if certain circumstances change. But the future 
of technology and social norm development is difficult to predict. 296 A better 
approach might simply be to recognize that judicial precedents involving sur-
veillance technology may require reexamination when circumstances shift or 
when courts have the benefit of hindsight. 297 Relatedly, the Supreme Court 
could facilitate challenges to Fourth Amendment precedents by making clear 
that a defendant who successfully overturns a precedent will be able to exclude 
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evidence gathered in reliance on the overturned decision. 298 Limiting the 
“good faith” exception for officers who rely on existing law may be necessary 
to incentivize litigants to challenge questionable precedents. 299 
Lower courts, too, should be empowered to take account of changing cir-
cumstances or unworkable higher-court decisions in the Fourth Amendment 
context. Lower courts sometimes apply binding precedents narrowly, shaping 
the law’s application and signaling to appellate courts that a precedent may be 
erroneous or otherwise flawed. 300 This “precedential dialogue” should be en-
couraged in the Fourth Amendment context, where early interventions by 
higher courts may require revision over time. 301 Appeals courts can monitor 
lower-court narrowing and use it to identify precedents ripe for reexamina-
tion. 302 They might also encourage experimentation by expressly stating that 
lower courts will have a role in implementing a new standard or by citing 
lower court disagreements in opinions overturning prior decisions. 303 By em-
bedding flexibility in their decisions involving new technologies, courts can 
intervene to shape sociotechnical norms and prevent unchecked government 
surveillance while minimizing judicial errors over time. 
C. Alternative Institutional Structures 
A growing body of scholarship argues that new legislative approaches and 
administrative structures can help courts govern the sprawling surveillance sys-
tems of law enforcement. 304 Daphna Renan has suggested that an independent 
administrative agency—like a more robust Privacy and Civil Liberties Board—
can make a “programmatic probable cause determination” that situates a given 
incident of a search or seizure within the wider ecosystem of law enforcement 
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surveillance. 305 Christopher Slobogin has proposed that the Administrative 
Procedure Act and its state and municipal counterparts should be interpreted 
as requiring police agencies to apply standard rulemaking procedures to per-
vasive surveillance programs. 306 These proposals would allow standardized 
procedures and built-in expertise, the hallmarks of a functioning administra-
tive state, to put limits on surveillance at the systems stage. Administrative 
rules can also supplement the judiciary’s efforts to nudge sociotechnical 
norms by adding an additional “point of entry” for law—“judicial review at 
the level of program design.”307 This allows the law to use its expressive power 
not just on a single incident of surveillance but also on the structures that sup-
port it. 
To implement this, scholars suggest that courts direct their decisions to 
policymakers, calling on them to write rules that prevent recurring injustice 
in addition to speaking directly to police on the ground. 308 Such a structure 
could combine the prophylactic rules of cases like Miranda v. Arizona 309 with 
broader directives to legislatures to change police procedures, as seen in cases 
like United States v. Wade. 310 This could represent a sea change in how courts 
frame their opinions, 311 and there are epistemic and practical reasons why 
courts calling on policymakers to write prescriptive rules might counteract 
antiprivacy norms. Agencies may have greater expertise, particularly regard-
ing the whole picture of law enforcement’s surveillance systems, than common 
law courts making one-off decisions. 312 Agencies can also write prescriptive 
rules and engage in nimble policy experimentation, allowing them to adjust 
proposals as they observe the downstream consequences of their actions. 313 
Of course, it does little good if agencies provide a veneer of accountability 
while entrenching substantive injustice below the surface. 314 There may also 
be a role for local communities or activist groups to directly shape the surveil-
lance practices used in a given community. Giving these groups a role in es-
tablishing rules for policing may also allow them to influence choices about 
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surveillance techniques and privacy interests. 315 Community preferences 
might be enacted directly as a matter of prescriptive policy, without depending 
on judges to interpret community norms and behaviors. These collaborations 
can offer additional means through which regulatory power can counterbal-
ance technologies’ built-in surveillance norms. 
Lawmakers can also shape social norms relevant to privacy by influencing 
corporate behavior. This is at least one of the goals of the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR), the European Union’s comprehensive data pro-
tection law. 316 It provides EU citizens with a litany of rights to their data, 
including rights to access, correct, delete, and transport their data, among oth-
ers. 317 In addition, the GDPR imposes procedural and compliance obligations 
on companies as they collect and process data from their customers. Compa-
nies have to hire data protection officers to oversee corporate compliance with 
the law. 318 They also have to keep extensive data processing records, which 
can be requisitioned by regulators during an investigation. 319 And in certain 
circumstances the GDPR requires regulated organizations to conduct impact 
assessments about data processing and collection as well as platform design. 320 
These internal requirements are supposed to give companies a standard pro-
tocol for assessing privacy risks. But as Margot Kaminski suggests, they are 
also supposed to affect how companies conceptualize their data privacy obli-
gations, nudging them by keeping privacy front of mind during the design and 
compliance processes. 321 
This form of “collaborative governance” is incomplete. It allows corporate 
entities to be directly involved in the creation, interpretation, and application 
of what the law actually requires, undermining the law’s ability to achieve its 
social ends. 322 Nor are administrative agencies likely to effectively regulate 
surveillance on their own; agencies can be politicized and subject to regulatory 
capture. 323 But agencies need not work alone. An effective system of govern-
ance requires agencies, legislatures, and the courts: the first two can write rules 
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while engaged in a systemic review of the criminal justice system, and the third 
can apply judicial review to those rules. 324 
CONCLUSION 
Prevailing social norms often determine the direction of Fourth Amend-
ment law. Courts and scholars have lauded norm reliance as judicial humility 
in the face of rapidly changing technology. This Article has challenged that 
conventional wisdom in two respects. It has shown that judicial reliance on 
social norms is more nuanced than previously understood: courts rely on 
them when they appear to have settled but decline to get involved when social 
norms—particularly those relating to new surveillance technologies—are still 
being contested. This Article has also shown how current adjudicative para-
digms undermine the promise of the Fourth Amendment. By adopting exist-
ing norms without questioning whether they are justifiable, courts have 
embedded discriminatory concepts in Fourth Amendment law. And nonin-
tervention leaves sociotechnical norms to develop in accordance with the 
data-extractive interests of technology companies. As courts remain on the 
sidelines, our privacy slips away: we become inured to the perceived normalcy 
of surveillance practices, and new technologies creep more and more toward 
surveillance. Whether we can reverse course with new judicial and institu-
tional approaches is an open question. But we can start by understanding the 
risks of the Fourth Amendment’s current relationship with social norms and 
envisioning a different path. 
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